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DeJong: DeJong: Omitted Property

OMITTED PROPERTY IN
DISSOLUTION DECREES
Chrun v. Chrun'
What procedure must a former spouse follow to have property which
has been omitted from an original marital dissolution decree distributed

in a subsequent court proceeding? Omitted property may include a pension
plan, a vacation cabin, retirement benefits or other assets acquired during
the marriage. The decree may have omitted the property as a result of
perjured testimony, a false affidavit concerning an incomplete disclosure

of marital property or simple inadvertence. In Chrun v. Chrun,2 the Missouri
Supreme Court definitively ruled that the proper procedure for dividing
marital property not divided in an original dissolution decree was to bring
an independent suit in equity.3
Problems involving undistributed property in dissolution decrees have
arisen periodically in Missouri. Omitted property procedural problems arise
when a former spouse discovers property not distributed by the divorce
decree after the decree's time for appeal has run and the degree has thus
become final. 4 Upon making this discovery, the former spouse wishes to
reopen the decree and modify the original judgment. 5 The former spouse
is confronted with the procedural problem of how to have the property
distributed. A recent Missouri case involving property not divided in an
original dissolution decree stated:
[T]here is rank confusion and disagreement regarding the status of property
of the parties not disposed of by a dissolution court .... Our courts have
indicated that there is no appealable judgment where the trial court fails
to set-off all marital and separate
property of the parties appearing on
6
the face of the trial record.
In the past, Missouri's western and eastern districts have disagreed over
the proper procedure for dividing marital property not included in an

1.
2.
3.
4.
405, 406
5.
6.

Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 755.
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 81.05(a); State ex rel. McClintock v. Black, 608 S.W.2d
(Mo. 1980) (en banc).
McClintock, 608 S.W.2d at 406.
Id. (citations omitted).
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original dissolution decree.7 In June, 1988, however, the Supreme Court
of Missouri handed down a decision which resolved some of this confusion.8
Yet, the decision nonetheless left considerable uncertainty in the area of
property omitted from an original dissolution decree.
Chrun v. Chrun9 resolved the conflict in favor of the traditional western
district view.' 0 This view held that the proper procedure for dividing marital
property which had not been divided in an original dissolution decree was
to bring an independent suit in equity." In light of Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 74.06, however, there may be another procedure for distributing
2
the omitted property to obtain relief from the judgment.'
This Note will discuss Missouri cases concerning omitted property in
dissolution decrees. It will analyze both the conflicting rationales which
courts traditionally employ, and the current procedures for seeking a remedy
as set forth in Chrun. 3 Finally, this Note will examine the anticipated
effect of Rule 74.06 as a procedural device for obtaining relief from a
dissolution decree which omits marital property. 14
HISTORY OF CHRUN

The history of Missouri case law involving omitted property and similar
issues provides a useful context for analyzing the Missouri Supreme Court's
Chrun decision. Before Chrun, Missouri's definitive case on the subject

was State ex rel. McClintock v. Black.' 5 In McClintock, a former wife

sought to vacate a dissolution decree when she realized that certain property
had been omitted.' 6 The omitted property included shares of stock in a
closely held corporation and a retirement fund. '7 McClintock stated that
the original decree was res judicata and the judgment from the original
dissolution decree was final.' McClintock, noting the statutory void in the
area of undistributed property, made a request for assistance from the
legislature; "[w]e can reasonably anticipate that the General Assembly will
fill in this patent gap in the Dissolution of Marriage Law."' 9 In the absence

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 754
Id. at 752.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id. at 754-55; McClintock, 608 S.W.2d
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 74.06; see infra note
Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755
Id.
608 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1980) (en bane).
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
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at 407.
117 and accompanying text.
(Mo. 1988) (en banc).
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of a statutory provision, McClintock suggested filing an independent suit
in equity. 20
Another case from the western district, Gehm v. Gehm, 21 followed
McClintock's approach. 22 In Gehm, the trial court expressly changed an
original dissolution decree to divide property which had been omitted from
the decree.? The appellate court held that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to consider a modification or change of the original property
settlement. 24 The court in Gehm noted, "[w]hen a trial court has made a
partial distribution of property and the judgment is final, the court has
no jurisdiction under a motion filed in the original case to determine the
2
nature of omitted property or provide for its distribution." 1
Similarly, in Murphy v. Murphy,26 a former wife moved to modify a
final dissolution decree so as to include her former husband's omitted
military pension plan.27 The trial court granted the motion and divided the
property. 28 When the former husband appealed, the appellate court held
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.2 Murphy
stated that a motion to modify the property division portion of the decree
was ineffective in that the cause of action was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court once the decree became final.3 0
Conversely, cases from the eastern district have generally held that the
trial court retains jurisdiction where property is left undistributed in an
original dissolution decree? 1 These cases have relied upon section 452.330

20. Id.
21. Gehm v. Gehm, 707 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 494.
24. Id. at 495.
25. Id.
26. Murphy v. Murphy, 716 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.at 871.
30. Id.
31. Michael v. Michael, 727 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (marital
property remained undistributed, thus the trial court had not exhausted its jurisdiction because it had not rendered a final judgment); Frame v. Frame, 696 S.W.2d
332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (if dissolution decree does not dispose of all property
the judgment is not final); Hilton v. Hilton, 676 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(court failed to exhaust its jurisdiction and thus failed to render a final judgment);
Ploch v. Ploch, 635 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (trial court could dispose of
property in post-dissolution decree proceeding); Schulz v. Schulz, 612 S.W.2d 380
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (court is required to divide marital property and until it has
done so it has not exhausted its jurisdiction); L. F. H. v. R. L. H., 543 S.W.2d
520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (failure to dispose of property makes an order non-final;
trial court has not exhausted its jurisdiction). But see Kuntzman v. Kuntzman, 724
S.W.2d 331 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (motion dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Stark
v. Thierjung, 714 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (trial court lacked jurisdiction
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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of Missouri Revised Statutes to provide authority to enter a judgment
disposing of the omitted property 2 The section provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or legal separation
or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the
marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall
set apart to each spouse his property in such proportions as the court

deems just after considering all relevant factors

. . .33

In Ploch v. Ploch,3 4 a case from the eastern district, a former wife
sought to reopen a dissolution decree to divide her husband's profit-sharing
trust which had been omitted from the original decree." Ploch held that
section 452.330 allows post-decree proceedings,3 6 and indicated that until
the court has distributed all of the marital property, it has not rendered
a final judgment.3 7 The basis for this rationale is found in the language
of section 452.330, which directs that a court "shall" divide all property.38
Ploch held that the court has an affirmative obligation under the statute
to divide all of the property.3 9 Until it has done so, it has not exhausted
its jurisdiction. 40 Accordingly, Ploch indicated that "the only issue germane
to maintaining such a proceeding is whether property remains undisposed
'4
of, not why it remains so." 1

Ploch glossed over section 452.330 and construed it as initiating "a
special statutory proceeding contemplated by the statute so as to provide
for modification of a decree." 42 However, nothing in the statute indicates
that such a gloss is appropriate. Ploch relied on statutory authority which
was merely contemplated; the court held that the language of the statute
intended to grant the authority to modify the decree.43 Ploch searched for
a statutory provision which directs Missouri courts in cases where property
had been omitted from an original dissolution decree. However, McClintock

to consider former wife's motion); Henderson v. Henderson, 622 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1981) (issue of undistributed marital property was not proper subject for
motion to modify).

32. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.1 (Supp. 1986).
33. Id.
34. Ploch v. Ploch, 635 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
35. Id.
36. Id.at 71.
37. Id. at 72. See also Schulz v. Schulz, 612 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (the obligation to distribute property is not dependent upon whether
the dissolution is contested, uncontested or by default).
38. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330 (Supp. 1986).
39. Ploch v. Ploch, 635 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
40. Schulz, 612 S.W.2d at 382. See cases cited supra note 31.
41. Ploch, 635 S.W.2d at 72.
42. Id. (citing Chenoweth v. Chenoweth, 575 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1978)).
43.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/9
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previously had noted this "patent gap" in the Dissolution of Marriage
Laws. Thus, it was necessary for Ploch to disregard that gap and to impose
a strained construction of section 452.330. 44 Ploch construed the statute to
accommodate the problem of undistributed property. 45 It distinguished
McClintock on the basis that in McClintock the former spouse sought to
change a property division, whereas in Ploch the former spouse sought to
reopen the dissolution decree.46 Actually, the former spouse in McClintock
filed a motion to vacate the decree because certain property had not been
distributed. 47 The purpose of both actions was to distribute omitted property.
Subsequently, Gehm criticized48 and Chrun49 expressly overruled the use
of section 452.330 as statutory authority to allow post-decree proceedings
to distribute undistributed property. Gehm and Chrun construed the statute
as applying only when the court is "without personal jurisdiction to distribute the property originally and such jurisdiction is subsequently ac50
quired."
Although Chrun did not discuss similar proceedings in the southern
district, in Edic v. Edic,51 the Southern District Court of Appeals followed
the rationale set forth in Ploch.5 2 Edic held that the trial court retained
jurisdiction to distribute property left undistributed in an original dissolution
decree.53 The court stated alternatively that the decree "may not have been
final."m The Edic court proposed that undistributed property was not part
of the original proceeding, and thus a claim for the undistributed property
was not res judicata.5 5 Edic also relied on section 452.330 as statutory
56
authority to reopen a dissolution decree which had omitted property.
Schulz v. Schulz, 57 a similar case, held that the judgment should be
final only as to property distributed by the decree.5 8 Schulz stated that a
trial court retained jurisdiction to distribute property in a subsequent proceeding because there was no basis on which to conclude that res judicata

44. State ex rel. McClintock v. Black, 608 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (en banc). See also Sink v. Sink, 669 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(involved action to distribute former husband's retirement plan and rested on
rationale in Ploch).
45. Ploch, 635 S.W.2d at 72.
46. Id. at 71.
47.

McClintock, 608 S.W.2d at 406.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Gehm v. Gehm, 707 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
Gehm, 707 S.W.2d at 495. See also Chrun, 751 S.W.2d at 755.
729 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 631 n.2.
Id.at 631.
Id.
612 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
Id.
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would apply to property that had not been judicially acted upon. 9
The rationales set forth in Edic and Schulz have met with little approval 0 A claim to marital property is considered one cause of action;
therefore, the judgment is res judicata.6 1 There is not a separate claim for
each item of property.6 2 Yet, "[t]he [Missouri] statutes are silent as to how
to deal with issues relating to property which remain unresolved after a
decree of dissolution has become final." '63 Missouri law does not allow the
reopening of the property division provisions of a final dissolution decree."6
CHRUN V. CHRUN

In Chrun, a former wife brought an action to modify an original
dissolution decree or, alternatively, to distribute undistributed assets.65 Her
former husband's pension plan had not been included in the dissolution
decree because at the time of the original decree the husband's pension
plan was not considered marital property.6 Subsequent case law established
that the pension plan was marital property, thus subject to division upon
divorce.67 Accordingly, the former wife sought to have the pension plan
distributed.6 8 The trial court, following Ploch v. Ploch,69 decided the case
on the merits and awarded the wife approximately one third of the husband's
current monthly pension paymentY0 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Eastern District reversed the case on the merits. 71 The appellate court
certified the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri for a decision concerning
the procedure for dividing marital property omitted from an original dissolution decree. 7 2
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the former wife's claim on several

grounds. First, the court held that a dissolution decree is res judicata and
thus barred her claim.73 Res judicata "generally applies to judgments of

59. Id.
60. See Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
61. Id. at 755.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Halbrook v. Halbrook, 740 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
65. Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
66. Id. at 754.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 635 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
70. Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). The trial
court noted the conflict between Gehm and Ploch, but considered itself bound by
Ploch, an eastern district case. Id.
71. Id.at 753.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 754. See also Leventhal v. Leventhal, 629 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981); Hedgecorth v. Hedgecorth, 463 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971);
Ezell v. Ezell, 348 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); McKenzie v. McKenzie, 306
S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 587 (1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/9
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divorce which settle property rights, . . . and [is] a bar to a subsequent
action . . . ."74 This would include judgments of divorce where the parties
inadvertently forgot to request division of a specific piece of property. 75
76
Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim.
The Supreme Court also held that if a party does not request the
division of property, the judgment is still final as to all property claims
that were or could have been litigated. 77 Third, the court held that to find
the decree was not final would be to repeal section 452.360 of the Missouri
Revised Statues, which provides that a court order "as it affects distribution
8
of marital property shall be a final order not subject to modification.'" 7
Moreover, parties may not attack judgments concerning divorce proceedings
79
collaterally for irregularities.
Chrun stated that the remedy for a party discovering omitted property

was to file an independent suit in equity. 8" The procedure which Chrun
recommended conformed with the western district decisions. 8' Thus, in
Chrun, the Supreme Court of Missouri definitively ruled that a trial court
does not retain jurisdiction over omitted property on the grounds that the
omitted property was not a claim or issue litigated.8 2 The court further
ruled that section 452.330 did not provide statutory authority to reopen

a dissolution decree after the decree had become final. 3 A previous case,
4 identified the problem in Missouri; "rather
In re Marriage of Quintard,1
than providing a procedural mechanism by which a marital dissolution
decree might be re-examined, Missouri law rigorously stresses the finality
thereof."5
REMEDY FOR OMITTED PROPERTY SITUATIONS

What remedy is available to a former spouse discovering property

omitted from an original dissolution decree? Chrun expressly confirmed

74.
75.
76.

27C C.J.S. Divorce § 587 (1986); see cases cited supra note 73.
State ex rel. McClintock v. Black, 608 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).

77. Id. at 754. See also McKenzie, 306 S.W.2d at 592.
78. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d at 754 (quoting State ex rel. McClintock v. Black,
608 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Mo. 1980) (en banc)); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.360.2 (Supp.
1986). Subsection 2 provides: "The court's order as it affects distribution of marital
property shall be a final order not subject to modification." Id.

79. 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 589 (1986).
80. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d at 755.
81. See Murphy v. Murphy, 716 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Gehm
v. Gehm, 707 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). The procedure is also in conformity
with Missouri Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. McClintock v. Black, 608
S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
82. Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
83. Id.

84. In re Marriage of Quintard, 691 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
85. Id. at 953.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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previous cases from the western district which required an independent suit
in equity.86 This remedy sounds promising. In reality, however, the remedy
is misleading in that there are extremely limited grounds for which a court
will hear a claim for an independent suit in equity.
The grounds for equitable relief set forth in Chrun are extrinsic fraud,
accident or mistake.8 7 Extrinsic fraud is difficult to prove; "[f]raud extrinsic
to the judgment is shown when proof of facts is made which if known
to the trial court would have caused the trial court to not enter the judgment
...

."1

Facts which would have caused the court to enter a different

judgment do not constitute a basis for extrinsic fraud.8 9 For instance, false
statements or allegations in a divorce petition concerning disclosure of
property, false statements in an affidavit or even false testimony do not
constitute extrinsic fraudY0 These facts usually show only that the court
would have entered a different judgment, not that the court would not
have entered the judgment. 9' Therefore, it may be difficult or impossible
to prove extrinsic fraud where one party or both parties have merely
neglected to include property, or even where one party has intentionally
omitted property. In such cases, the court would have entered the judgment,
notwithstanding the fact that the court would have entered a different
judgment.
Additionally, extrinsic fraud relates "not to the propriety of the judgment itself, but to the manner in which the judgment was obtained." 92 A
party seeking to set aside a prior judgment obtained by extrinsic fraud
must establish fraud by strong, clear, cogent and convincing evidence. 9
There must be no neglect, fault or inattention on his part. For example,
conduct which could constitute extrinsic fraud includes a husband's representation that his lawyer would look out for his wife's estate in divorce
proceedings or a representation that the wife would not need her own
lawyer. 95

86. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d at 755.
87. Id.
88. Harrison v. Harrison, 734 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Gehm v. Gehm, 707 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)) (emphasis in original).
See also Vinson v. Vinson, 725 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Daffin v. Daffin,
567 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
89. In re Marriage of Brown, 703 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
F....._ v. F.., 333 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
90. F......_, 333 S.W.2d at 323.
91. Harrison, 734 S.W.2d at 939.
92. Jones v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). Jones also
indicated that "relief is limited to those instances where the fraud was of such a
character as to have forestalled an opportunity for the fair submission of the
controversy." Id.
93. F......_, 333 S.W.2d at 323-25.
94. Id.
95. Vinson v. Vinson, 725 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Daffin
v. Daffin, 567 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/9
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More particularly, in Harrison v. Harrison,96 the husband, an attorney
filing for divorce, told his wife that she was "entitled to no portion of
the law firm . . . -97 He threatened that if she hired a certain attorney
of which he did not approve he would drag the divorce out forever, 98 and
that she must go through with the divorce according to his terms. 99 He
also told her that as an attorney, he knew how judges react and what
courts would allow in dissolution and thus she had no other choice than
to sign the agreement. 100 Finally, he informed her that one of his partners
would draft all of the legal papers and handle all of the legal work on
behalf of both of them and she was not to consult with another attorney. 1 1
The court held that this claim could constitute extrinsic fraud, 0 2 because
it appeared that the wife had been denied her day in court. However, it
seems that a false affidavit or perjury could also be so harmful as to deny

a former spouse his or her day in court. 103
The two other grounds for an independent suit in equity set forth in

Chrun are accident and mistake. 1' 4 Accident and mistake are grounds which
encompass a surprisingly narrow range of circumstances. An accident is
generally thought to be something which could not have been foreseen,
i.e., something which happens without the negligence of a party.I°5 Similarly,
a mistake is "an erroneous mental condition which results in some act or
without its erroneous
omission by one or both parties to a transaction, but
I0 6
time.'
the
at
known
or
intended
character being
There are few, if any, Missouri cases brought for the distribution of
omitted property on the grounds of accident or mistake. Suits in equity
are more often brought on the ground of extrinsic fraud. 10 7 By comparison,
default cases demonstrate the difficulty of proving an action based on
accident or mistake. For instance, "if a court clerk makes a mistake by
not properly recording a motion, .

..

[a] default judgment can be set aside

.... ,"108Similarly, if a "defendant and his attorney are prevented by
illness from filing an answer, a separate suit in equity has been used to

96.

Harrison v. Harrison, 734 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).

97.

Id. at 937.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 941.
See Laughrey, Default Judgments in Missouri, 50 Mo. L. REv. 841, 856

(1985).

104. Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
105. BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 14 (5th ed. 1979).
106. 2 PoMsnRoY's EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 839 (1905).
107. See Harrison v. Harrison, 734 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Daffin
v. Daffin, 567 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).

108. See Laughrey, supra note 103, at 855 (citing Krashin v. Grizzard, 326
Mo. 606, 31 S.W.2d 984 (1930)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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set the default aside on the grounds of accident."' 0 9 It makes little sense
to say that a court will set aside a judgment for mistake when a party
and his attorney are prevented from filing an answer, but not when a
party's opponent 'merely' commits perjury, which is intrinsic fraud. Surely
a former spouse claiming omitted property has essentially been denied his
day in court." 0
Furthermore, to prove mistake, the mistake must be free from any
negligence on the part of the party seeking relief."' "Equity will not relieve
against a mistake when the party complaining had within his reach means
of ascertaining the true state of facts, and, without being induced thereto
by the other party, neglected to avail himself of his opportunities of
information."' Thus, any inadvertence in failing to present evidence of
omitted property is not a ground for modification." 3 Unfortunately, there
is no extrinsic fraud, accident or mistake when property is omitted by the
inadvertence or negligence of a party who had the means of ascertaining
which property should have been divided.14
Prior case law in the area of omitted property suggests that there have
been few successful actions for an independent suit in equity."' As a
practical matter, a former spouse discovering omitted property may be
without a remedy. Lack of redress is surely contrary to a former spouse's
expectations of fairness and can operate as a windfall to the other spouse
in whose favor the property has been inadvertently or intentionally omitted.
A separate suit in equity does not seem to be a practical or viable means
of redress. Therefore, there should be another remedy available to a former
spouse claiming omitted property.
MihssouRi SuprmE CoURT RULE 74.06
According to Chrun, there may be another potential means of obtaining
redress." 6 In May, 1987 the Missouri Supreme Court adopted Rule 74.06."1

109. Id. at 855 (citing Jackson v. Chestnut, 151 Mo. App. 275, 131 S.W.
747 (1910)).
110. Id. at 856.
111. Falcon Enter., Inc. v. Precise Forms, Inc., 509 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1974); Hamm v. Hamm, 437 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
112. Barret, Fitch, North & Co. v. Hudson, 403 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1966) (citing Brown v. Fagan, 71 Mo. 563 (1880)).

113. See State ex rel. Gary Realty Co. v. Hall, 322 Mo. 1118, 1127, 17
S.W.2d 935, 938 (1928) (en banc).
114. Id.
115. See Harrison v. Harrison, 734 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
116. Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
117. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 74.06. The rule provides:
(a) Clerical Mistakes-Procedure. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or
other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/9
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The Rule went into effect on January 1, 1988, and provides for relief
from judgments or orders.

18

The official comment notes: "[t]he

Rule

provides a single rule for all of the procedures required to set aside a

final judgment when the judgment is by default or as a result of trial."' 119
Chrun,20° and a more recent case Born v. Born, 12' have indicated that the
Rule may apply to afford relief from a dissolution decree which omitted
marital property.'2 However, a motion under the Rule must be made "not

omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Excusable Neglect-Fraud-Irregular, Void, or Satisfied Judgment. On
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (3) the judgment is irregular;
(4) the judgment is void; or (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment remain
in force.
(c) Motion Under Subdivision (b)-Affect on Judgment - Time for FilingNotice of Hearing-Service. A motion under subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1) and (2) and (3) of
subdivision (b) not more than one year after the judgment or order was
entered. The motion and a notice of a time and place for hearing on the
motion shall be served upon the parties to the judgment pursuant to Rule
54.
(d) Power of Court to Entertain Independent Action-Certain Writs Abolished. This Rule 74.06 does not limit the power of the court to entertain

an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment or order or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis,
coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature
of a bill of review are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these Rules
or by an independent action.
118. Id.
119. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 74.06 comment on 1988 amendment.
120. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d at 755 n.l.
121. Born v. Born, 753 S.W.2d 121, 122 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) states:
Rule 74.06 (effective January 1, 1988) is not applicable in this case. Rule
74.06 allows a post-final judgment motion in enumerated circumstances.
Such a motion must be filed within one year of entry of the judgment.
Thereafter, an independent suit in equity is required. Because wife filed
her motion nearly five years after the dissolution decree was entered, even
if Rule 74.06 applied, she would have been required to file an independent
suit inequity.
Id. (citation omitted).
122. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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more than one year after the judgment or order was entered."'2 Thus,
there is a fairly narrow time restriction for obtaining relief. In Chrun and
Born, Rule 74.06 did not apply because the suits were brought more than
one year after the judgment was entered.'2
To date, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 74.06 has not been applied to
a case involving omitted property in a dissolution decree.2 5 Given that the
Rule has been expressly noted in two recent cases, it appears courts anticipate
that the Rule will apply to omitted property cases when the2 6 action is
brought within one year after the judgment has been entered.
The Rule is not likely to open a floodgate of relief from judgment
motions in omitted property situations. The one year provision requires
that a party, unaware of omitted property at the time the dissolution decree
was entered, become aware of the omitted property and act within one
year to utilize the Rule. 127 If the party does not discover the property until
after one year, the proper procedure for seeking a remedy would be to
file an independent suit in equity. 28 Thus, Rule 74.06 does not eliminate
the separate suit in equity. 2 9 Unfortunately, a former spouse often is not
aware of omitted property until several years after the decree was entered.""
The Rule reflects a limited exception to the finality of judgments and may
afford some assistance to parties who exercise particular care in discovering
what property should have been distributed in the original decree."'
Although Rule 74.06 may not have a great impact on the now established
remedy of an independent suit in equity, the Rule is of somewhat greater
significance in that it provides a much broader range of grounds for relief
than the grounds applicable to an independent suit in equity.3 2 The additional grounds result in mixed consequences. Chrun stated that the grounds
3
for an independent suit in equity were accident, mistake, or extrinsic fraud.
Under Rule 74.06 the grounds for relief include mistake, surprise, inadvertence, excusable neglect, intrinsic or extrinsic fraud, misrepresentation,

123.

Mo. Sup. CT. R. 74.06, supra note 117.

124.

Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755 n.1 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Born,

753 S.W.2d 121, 122 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
125. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d at 755.
126. Id. See also Born, 753 S.W.2d at 122 n.1.
127. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 74.06(c), supra note 117.
128. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 74.06(d), supra note 117.
129. Id.
130. Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (11 years); Born
v. Born, 753 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (5 years); Harrison v. Harrison,
734 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (4 years); Kuntzman v. Kuntzman, 724
S.W.2d 331 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (13 years); Murphy v. Murphy, 716 S.W.2d 870
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (3 years); Ploch v. Ploch, 635 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (2 years); Schulz v. Schulz, 612 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (2 years).
131. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 74.06(b), supra note 117.
132. Id.
133. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d at 755.
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or an irregular judgment.134 If a party discovers omitted property and takes
action within one year of the judgment, that party will have more grounds
upon which to move for relief from the original dissolution decree.'35
has passed, the grounds
However, after a year from the final judgment
36
are restricted to those set forth in Chrun.1
One of the most important aspects of the Rule is that when a motion
is made within one year, intrinsic fraud will be a ground upon which relief
may be granted. 37 Intrinsic fraud includes "knowing use of perjured testimony or otherwise fabricated evidence.' '1 38 Intrinsic fraud will generally
be easier to prove than extrinsic fraud, and the inclusion of intrinsic fraud
makes good policy sense. Previously, a party could not obtain relief even
when it was clear that the other party had produced false affidavits or
had lied on the stand.139 Thus, under Rule 74.06, the court may look into
the propriety of the judgment in such circumstances.
Unfortunately, the practicality of the broader range of grounds for
relief under Rule 74.06 is not consistent with the grounds for relief set
forth in Chrun. 4° For example, while Rule 74.06 will grant relief for
intrinsic fraud, Chrun will grant relief only for extrinsic fraud.' 41 Combined,
Rule 74.06 and the equitable grounds for relief in Chrun could result in
a potentially unfair situation. For instance, suppose a former spouse can
prove intrinsic fraud but not extrinsic fraud. If the former spouse brings
a motion for relief under Rule 74.06 exactly one year after the final
judgment, the former spouse could be granted relief.1 42 Conversely, if the
former spouse brings the motion for relief exactly one year and a day
after the final dissolution decree, the former spouse will not be able to
obtain relief because of Rule 74.06's time limitation. 43 This result appears
inherently unjust.
NEED FOR A STATUTORY PROVISION

DEALING WITH OMITTED PROPERTY

The legislature should act in the area of omitted property to avoid the
potentially inconsistent and unfair consequences of the application of Rule
74.06 coupled with the remedy of an independent suit in equity set forth

134.

Mo. Sup. CT. R. 74.06(b), supra note 117.

135. Id.
136. Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Mo. 1988) (en bane).
137. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 74.06(b), supra note 117.
138. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Adworks, Inc., 740 S.W.-2d 383, 385 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).
139.
140.
141.

142.
143.

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Mo. SuP. CT. R. 74.06, supra note 117.

See id.
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in Chrun.144 McClintock previously suggested an independent suit in equity
in lieu of a provision by the legislature; the independent suit in equity
was to serve as a remedy until the legislature acted and was not considered
the definitive procedural device for omitted property cases. 145 Furthermore,
Rule 74.06 is a general procedural rule providing relief from all applicable
46
judgments; it was not created specifically for omitted property situations. 1
Legislative action would reduce confusion and promote fairness in omitted
property cases. Furthermore, a statutory provision would provide clear
guidelines for practitioners dealing with such problems.
Additionally, claims to distribute omitted property perhaps call for
different procedural treatment than general rules relating to the finality of
judgments. Prior case law from the eastern district suggests an underlying
policy of allowing a party, under one procedural device or another, to
reopen a decree to provide for distribution of omitted property. 47 The
special context of divorce and the need for a fair resolution of property
distribution calls for a provision apart from Rule 74.06 and the remedy,
or lack thereof, of an independent suit in equity.
Furthermore, Rule 74.06 and the independent suit in equity are intended
to set aside the final judgment and completely redistribute the property.
A legislative provision could prevent setting aside the entire original division
of property. It would be more practical to have a statutory provision
specifically addressing omitted property. Such a provision is simply missing
from Missouri's Dissolution of Marriage Laws. Unfortunately, eight years
after McClintock first requested the legislature to fill this "patent gap"
in the Dissolution of Marriage Laws, the "patent gap" still exists. 4 8
JANE A. DEJONO

144. See State ex rel. McClintock v. Black, 608 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Mo. 1980)
(en banc).,
145.

Mo. SuP. CT. R. 74.06, supra note 117.

146. Id.
147. See Sink v. Sink, 669 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Ploch v. Ploch,
635 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Schulz v. Schulz, 612 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
148. State ex rel. McClintock v. Black, 608 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/9

14

